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F R O M  T H E  C A N A D I A N  W A R  M U S E U M  A R C H I V E S
Sir Richard Turner and the Second 
Battle of Ypres, April and May 1915
M A R K  O S B O R N E  H U M P H R I E S  & 
L Y N D S A Y  R O S E N T H A L
Abstract: The Second Battle of Ypres remains one of the most contentious 
Canadian actions of the First World War, thanks in large measure to the 
uneven performance of Brigadier-Generals Arthur Currie and Richard 
Turner. Turner in particular has been singled out for criticism over three 
key decisions he made during the fighting in late April 1915. The George 
Metcalf Archival Collection in the Canadian War Museum’s Military 
History Research Centre holds Turner’s papers, including his letters and 
a diary written soon after the battle. Here those primary sources are re­
printed for the first time along with a brief analysis. They reveal a man 
struggling to come to terms with what happened at Second Ypres.
T h e  Se c o n d  B a t t l e  of Ypres remains one of the most contentious Canadian actions of the First World War. On the one hand, there 
is the view that Canadian troops held firm when French soldiers ran 
from the gas attack on their left and persevered against difficult odds.1 
On the other is the argument that while Canadian soldiers ultimately 
helped stem the tide of the German advance, Canadian commanders 
made poor decisions during the fighting which threatened the whole
1 Daniel Dancocks, Welcome to Flanders Fields: The First Canadian Battle of the 
Great War -  Ypres 1915 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988).
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Ypres salient.2 The consensus view lies somewhere in the middle with 
the main points of criticism directed at both Sir Arthur Currie and 
Sir Richard Turner, both brigadiers general in 1915 fighting in their 
first action of the war.
Over time, Richard Turner’s reputation has probably fared worse 
than Currie’s. He has his defenders, notably Andrew Iarocci and Bill 
Stewart,3 but it is difficult to avoid reaching Tim Cook’s moderate 
conclusion that Turner was an uneven commander at best.4 Indeed, 
he was often flustered and sometimes confusted as is clearly evident 
in his letters and pseudo-diary entries which survive from that period 
and which are held in the archives of the Canadian War Museum in 
Ottawa. We re-print those letters here for the first time. What can 
they tell us about Turner’s state of mind during and in the weeks 
immediately after Second Ypres?
Sir Richard Ernest Turner was born on 25 July 1871 in Quebec 
City to Emily and Richard Turner Sr., a prominent businessman 
and Tory Member of Parliament. Turner began his military career 
in 1892 when he joined the 10th Queen’s Own Hussars as a Second 
Lieutenant rising through the ranks to Major by 1900. That same 
year, Turner married his fiancee Harriet Augusta Godday and after 
a brief honeymoon in Montreal, he departed for South Africa where 
he proved to be a capable, brave officer. In South Africa, he was 
awarded the Distinguished Service Order for swimming the Vet 
River under enemy fire, allowing the rest of the Royal Canadian 
Dragoons to cross the river resulting in a Boer retreat. At the Battle 
of Liliefontein on 7 November 1900, while suffering from gunshot 
wounds to the neck and arm, Turner still managed to rally his troops 
during a Boer attack, holding the line and saving several guns. For 
his actions there, he was awarded the Empire’s highest honour, the
2 For a discussion of the controversy see Tim Travers, “Currie and the First 
Canadian Division at Second Ypres, April 1915: Controversy, Criticism and Official 
History,” Canadian Military History, Vol 5 (1) Autumn 1996, 13.
3 Andrew Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers: The First Canadian Division at War, 1914­
1915 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) and Bill Stewart, “Every Inch 
a Fighting Man:” A New Perspective on the Military Career of a Controversial 
Canadian, Sir Richard Turner (Unpublished PhD Dissertation: University of 
Birmingham, 2012).
4 Tim Cook, ‘The Blind Leading the Blind: the Battle of the St. Eloi Craters,’ 
Canadian Military History 5, 2 (1996): 9-10.
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Victoria Cross. After returning to Quebec as a hero, he continued to 
serve before retiring from the military in 1912.5
Retirement would be short-lived as Turner returned to active 
service in the spring of 1914 at the insistence of his friend, Sir Sam 
Hughes, the Minister of Militia and Defence, who believed war with 
Germany was imminent. Turner’s experience in the field made him 
an obvious choice to command one of the three Canadian infantry 
brigades then being raised for overseas service. But while he had 
undeniably been a brave junior officer in South Africa, Turner’s 
leadership was controversial from the start. At the Second Battle of 
Ypres as the Brigadier General in command of 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, Turner made three critical decisions that some historians 
have argued constitute significant command errors. These are: his 
reaction to the initial German attack on 22 April, his hasty counter­
attack at Kitchener’s Wood that night, and his order to retreat to the 
gh q  line on 24 April.6
On 22 April, the Germans released chlorine gas at Ypres. In the 
ensuing panic, French units on the Canadian left fled leaving a gap in 
the line and exposing Turner’s flank for 7,300 meters. As Divisional 
Headquarters tried to assess the situation, General Alderson received 
a series of telegrams from Turner and his Brigade Major, Garnet 
Hughes, which created the impression the 3rd Brigade was in an 
untenable and precarious position. Although historians debate Turner’s 
and Hughes’s real intent, their messages could be read as saying 
that their left flank had been overrun and driven back even though 
their line was, in fact, still intact. Some historians have suggested 
that the confusing and misleading information in these messages is 
proof that Turner was an inept leader who panicked under pressure 
and that on 22 April had already lost control of the situation.7 Not 
everyone agrees though. In his examination of Turner’s actions that 
day, historian Andrew Iarocci argues, “while Turner and Hughes were 
obviously under great stress, their messages reflected the reality of the
5 Thomas P. Leppard, “The Dashing Subaltern: Sir Richard Turner in Retrospect,” 
Canadian Military History, 6, 2 (1997): 21-8 and Stewart, “Every Inch a Fighting 
Man,” 1-45.
6 Leppard, “The Dashing Subaltern.”
7 George H. Cassar, Hell in Flanders Fields: Canadians at the Second Battle of 
Ypres (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010), 321.
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Brigadier-General Garnet Hughes in July 
1916. [Library and Archives Canada PA 000356]
situation more faithfully than historians have hitherto allowed.”8 In 
his reassessment of the messages, Iarocci asserts that they were not, in 
fact, referring to 3rd Brigade’s left flank, but to the French unit on the 
“left of the Canadian left.”9 George Cassar, though, maintains that 
this is unlikely given that Turner had always differentiated between 
the French line and his own, and even admitted to General Alderson 
that he had been wrong the next day.10 At the same time, the situation 
was fluid and confusing and Turner might have been reacting to 
faulty intelligence rather than misreading the situation.11
In an effort to close the gap created by the gas attack, Turner 
and Hughes ordered the men of the 10th and 16th Battalions to 
mount a counter-attack at Kitcheners Wood that night in conjunction 
with a French counterattack on their left. Capitalizing on the cover
8 Andrew Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers: The First Canadian Division at War, 1914­
1915 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
9 Ibid., 119.
10 George H. Cassar, Hell in Flanders Fields: Canadians at the Second Battle of 
Ypres, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010), 120.
11 Tim Cook, At Sharp End Volume One: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 
1914-1916, (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 117.
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of night and the element of surprise, the objective of the assault was 
to prevent the Germans from using their newly gained position at 
Kitcheners Wood to mount an attack on St. Julien. This hastily 
organized assault has been criticized for the lack reconnaissance, the 
linear formations employed and the vague instructions 3rd Brigade 
Headquarters issued to the attacking troops. Specifically, on the last 
point, the Canadian battalions were not given any objectives outside 
of clearing the Germans out of the woods— an important point 
because there had not been enough time to for the reconnaissance 
necessary to determine where the German troops and artillery were 
located. Despite this lack of specific instructions as well as a complete 
lack of artillery support, the Canadians were able to advance about 
1,000 metres to the enemy’s line in the woods. But clearing the woods 
came at a high price: the two attacking battalions took 75 per cent 
casualties and later had to abandon the position.12
The third and most controversial decision Turner made was to 
order his units to fall back on the ghq Line on 24 April. After receiving 
several orders from Divisional Headquarters to hold his position 
at all costs, Turner ordered two of his battalions, and two British 
battalions that had come up to reinforce his trenches, to fall back to 
the ghq line. The ghq line was a partially completed second line of 
defence several kilometres to the rear of the frontline trenches, non­
existent aside from a line on the map in some places but strong and 
well-fortified in others. Turner’s decision left a nearly three kilometre 
gap in the British frontline and exposed the left flank of Currie’s 2nd 
Brigade at a crucial point in the battle. Had the Germans become 
aware of the gap, some historians have argued, they might have been 
able to advance and encircle the entire Canadian division.13
Turner later stated that he believed that the orders from 
Alderson to hold his position referred to the g h q  line and not the 
front line trenches. Historians remain divided on whether Turner 
misunderstood the order, or if he took matters into his own hands 
and deliberately misinterpreted or ignored their intent to save his 
brigade. Cassar maintains, “The most likely explanation was that 
Turner deliberately disobeyed orders, convinced that his battered
12 Cook, At Sharp End Volume One, 65-66.
13 T.H.E. Travers, ‘Allies in Conflict: The British and Canadian Official Historians 
and the Real Story of the Second Ypres,’ Journal of Contemporary History 24, 2 
(April 1989): 301-313.
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forces were about to be annihilated.”14 Iarocci, on the other hand, 
believes Turner was reacting to a developing situation and that his 
orders merely gave official sanction to an organic collapse all along 
the line. “In hindsight,” he writes, “Turner’s decision to withdrawal 
was disastrous but disaster had already destroyed three-quarters of 
his brigade before the order was even issued.”15 Iarocci contends that 
individual soldiers had already decided to pull out given that “even 
the best-disciplined soldiers and officers could not withstand chlorine 
poisoning and relentless enemy attacks. According to the mythology 
of Second Ypres, the Canadians were impossibly brave. In reality, 
courage had its limits.”16 In this context, Turner’s orders had little 
real effect so his decision to issue them is less of an error than a 
reflection of the disaster itself.
These controversies have overshadowed Turner’s reputation as 
a leader and battlefield commander even though there is no clear 
consensus as to what happened and why. In part this is because 
the surviving evidence is incomplete and open to a number of 
interpretations. As the British official historian James Edmonds 
discovered in the 1920s, many of the official war diaries do not 
seem to have survived the battle if they were kept at all, replaced 
by typewritten narratives that contradicted some of the original 
British war diaries that were available.17 Using these sources, the 
official historian of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, A.F. Duguid, 
concluded that Hughes and Turner had made critical errors in the 
battle, though he ultimately chose to downplay them in his official 
history. After reading Duguid’s interpretation of what happened at 
the battle, both Turner and Hughes demanded he rewrite the section 
on Second Ypres to highlight the role of the 3rd Brigade which they 
seemed to believe had been misrepresented.18 After dealing with their 
repeated requests, Duguid told them that they should be grateful 
that he had glossed over their potential disastrous errors within the
14 George H. Cassar, Trial by Gas: The British Army at Second Battle of Ypres 
(Nebraska: Potomac Press, 2014), 62.
15 Andrew Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers: The First Canadian Division at War, 1914­
1915 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 160.
16 Ibid., 160.
17 Tim Travers, “Currie and the First Canadian Division at Second Ypres, April 
1915: Controversy, Criticism and Official History,” Canadian Military History, Vol 
5 (1) Autumn 1996, 13.
18 Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World 
Wars (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), 84-85
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Lt.-Gen. R.E.W. Turner, V.C. [Library and 
Archives Canada PA 008006]
official history and they made no further requests.19 Whether evidence 
was deliberately destroyed and later concealed remains another area 
of some debate.20
Turner’s letters and diary entries offer insight into his mindset 
and perspective during the battle and in the days immediately 
afterwards when the enormity of events slowly came into perspective. 
At first glance, they make for strange reading because the entries are 
repetitive and somewhat confused. On the one hand, these documents 
can be taken as evidence that Turner was suffering from exhaustion 
and perhaps even shell shock: Stewart has suggested that Turner’s 
behaviour after the initial attack suggests that he had suffered a 
serious concussion in the bombardment and that could have led to 
memory loss helping to explain his decision-making during battle 
as well as his lack of recall after the event.21 On the other hand, 
though, each narrative is coherent and internally consistent with 
certain details omitted or added in each subsequent version. In either
19 Ibid., 84-85.
20 Travers, “Allies in Conflict,” 301-313.
21 Bill Stewart, “Every Inch a Fighting Man,” 70-77; Tim Cook, At Sharp End, 152.
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case, what comes through is a man struggling to makes sense of what 
happened during the battle and to construct an acceptable narrative 
of events.
There are three groups of documents reprinted here: several 
versions of what appears to be the same letter from Turner to his 
wife, a narrative diary of events (which also contains aspects of these 
letters), and an official typewritten report which he submitted in 
place of the 3rd Brigade war diary.
The three letters from Turner to his wife Hetty, dated 3, 8, and 9 
May 1915, may or may not have been actually been sent.22 If they were 
mailed, they are good evidence that Turner was unwell: after writing a 
letter to his wife on 8 May, the next day he began a new letter saying: 
“I do not remember when I wrote you last.” The other explanation 
is that Turner redrafted the same letter several times. This is more 
likely given the similarity of the wording between the 3 and 9 May 
letters and the fact that all three essentially recount the same events, 
seemingly for the first time. Clearly, though, Turner was struggling to 
make sense of what happened, aware that his own actions and those of 
his comrades were being scrutinized. As he wrote cryptically on 8 May: 
in addition to the heavy casualties at Second Ypres, “things happened 
to make matters worse, that I dare not write about.”
These letters suggest that Turner really did believe that 3rd 
Brigade had been outflanked by the Germans on 22 April. In his 
first note, Turner writes: “It is hard to explain all that happened. 
When the French fell back on my left it uncovered my flank for 5,000 
yards, and with a front of 2,300 yards, made my Bde responsible 
for 7,300 yard frontage. At 6:30pm on the 22nd, I really though all 
was lost; the enemy came sweeping down round our rear, and all 
that I had left were our servants, the Engineer Company, and about 
50 of my grenade Co.” This would suggest that when his Brigade 
Major, Garnet Hughes, told Arthur Currie that his left flank had 
been turned and was being driven in, he really was talking about 
3rd Brigade rather than the larger allied front. When Turner wrote 
the next letter again a few days later, he left those details out. In 
the third letter, though, he returned to the narrative of 3 May, albeit 
in a slightly modified form: “On the 22nd April the Germans came 
sweeping down on our left flank, in the big gap left by the French.
22 These are found in the Sir Richard Turner Papers, CWM No. 19710147-001, 
Archives of the Canadian War Museum.
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For a time I thought it was all up; the enemy had got well down in 
rear of my Head Quarters”
The Turner ‘narrative’ is a more difficult document to interpret 
because at various times it takes the form of a report, a retrospective 
narrative, a diary, or (in some places) a letter to Hetty.23 In its original 
form, it is written across 21 pages of 6x9 inch lined paper, hole- 
punched and inserted into a black binder with additional internal 
page numbers added to the top right corner. The 38 pages preceding 
the ‘narrative’ (which is the title given at the top of page 39 in the 
diary) read like a normal, past-tense series of diary entries. However 
it is clearly not contemporary. On page 43 (five of the narrative), 
Turner recounts the story of a Lieutenant Graham, 75th Battery, 
who fired his field gun over open sites, helping to protect Turner’s 
headquarters on 22 April. He then wrote in brackets “this officer 
was later sent to Gallipoli but I succeeded in getting the [Military 
Cross] for him.” Of course, this means that Turner must have written 
that passage long after the events— but how long after remains a 
mystery. The handwritten sheets are all identical in appearance and 
are written in the same ink with no breaks to indicate a change in 
continuity so the series of pages all appear to have been written at 
the same time. Three pages later, though, the narrative inexplicably 
returns to a first person, present-tense story with Turner recounting 
events as they unfold (‘One man just killed outside the front door’) 
before returning to language more consistent with a report (‘Col. F.S. 
Meighen was in Command of all troops in G.H.Q. 2nd line -  This line 
was strengthened and improved towards the north’). Transcriptions 
of field messages are interspersed with more diary entries before, on 
page 51, we find a transcribed version of the letter Turner addressed 
to Hetty on 3 May 1915 with a similar entry for the letter of 8 May 
on subsequent sheets.
Turner’s inclusion of the letters raises questions about the 
purpose and timing of his ‘narrative’. When compared side by side, 
the transcriptions are similar but differ in some key respects. The 8 
May transcription, for example, is notably different so that although 
both follow a similar pattern and some of the syntax is duplicated, 
in the transcribed version Turner left out the line ‘Things happened 
to make matters worse, that I dare not write about’ and added the
23 Sir Richard Turner Papers, CWM No. 19710147-001, Archives of the Canadian 
War Museum.
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statement ‘My head still feels as if it had been pounded.’ Instead of 
the line ‘We have had a heavy toll to pay, but I think Canada during 
those days absolutely saved the situation’ Turner’s transcribed version 
reads ‘General S-D called on me yesterday he said “I thank you for 
what you and your gallant men have done— you saved Ypres, and 
all our Army from a terrible disaster.” ’ This raises several important 
questions: what was the purpose of the narrative? Why were changes 
made when some of the documents were transcribed?
In writing his ‘narrative,’ it is clear that at some point long after 
the battle Turner tried to reconstruct the events of April 1915 using 
documents in his possession including a personal diary, contemporary 
letters, field messages, and reports. The original diary— if that is 
what the diary-like entries are taken from— is no longer in the file. 
That Turner would try to make sense of the complex battle is neither 
surprising nor problematic, but there are also some strong similarities 
between Turner’s ‘narrative’ and the ‘Diary of Operations’ which is 
the third document included here.24 This document took the place of 
the official 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade war diary for the period 22 
April to 5 May in the official Canadian records and it has sometimes 
been assumed that it was written soon after the battle. In the 1920s 
there was a lengthy, secret debate about the authenticity of Turner’s 
report as well as that submitted by General Arthur Currie after 
the battle. As Tim Travers demonstrated, British official historian 
James Edmonds believed that the original diaries had been destroyed 
or removed from the records in order to protect reputations and 
Edmonds certainly distrusted the narratives that took their place.25 
While we will never know for certain what actually happened, 
these documents raise the possibility that Turner’s report was not 
only written after the fact but long after the fact. Not surprisingly, 
the ‘narrative’ follows the same general chronology as the diary of 
operations, but the latter is far more detailed even though some lines 
are virtually identical in the two documents. Of course it is also 
possible that Turner was using the ‘diary of operations’ as a source 
for the ‘narrative’ in the same way he used his letters and personal 
diary. However, if this were the case one would expect that the
24 R.E.W. Turner, “Diary of Operations, 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade, 22nd 
April to 5th May 1915,” RG 9, Series III-D-3, Volume 4874, File 216 pt. 1, Library 
and Archives Canada.
25 Travers, “Allies in Conflict,” 301-313.
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‘narrative’ would employ the exact measurements cited in the ‘diary 
of operations’ rather than the less accurate estimates that actually 
appear in the text— in other words, the ‘diary of operations’ appears 
to be a more polished version of events. More perplexing, though, is 
the fact that both the third-person sections of the ‘narrative’ (22­
23 April), which we know was written long after the fact, and the 
first-person section presented as a diary (24-25 April) have sections 
which are almost identical to aspects of the ‘diary of operations.’ 
This is difficult to explain if the ‘narrative’ was written from both 
contemporary sources and the ‘diary of operations.’ What is more 
likely is that the ‘narrative’ is actually the chief source for or a rough 
draft of the ‘diary of operations’— when they were written, though, 
cannot be determined from the available evidence.
DOCUMENT ONE: R.E.W. TURNER LETTERS
Letter 3 May 1915 written on “A” Form-Messages and Signals
To: My Darling Hetty
I have not had any letters for some time and I fear letters were lost, as 
part of our mail in Ypres was blown up.
The troops have all had a heavy strain put upon them, and our losses 
have been large.
It will be a long time before brigade will be found to equal our former 
Canadian Brigade. My highlanders died at their posts, and I knew 
before the end came that they could not withdraw, as it was absolutely 
necessary to delay the enemy as long as possible. My men have been 
continuously under fire now since the 18th April, but if everything goes 
well they are to be withdrawn at 2:15 tomorrow morning.
Our rest is essential, as the regiment have to be completely re-organized 
again.
I have not been able to get my head clear since a week.
11
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At the present time we are living in a dug out which is large enough 
for four of us lying down, and the telephone which connects with the 
regiment-nearly 1 mile away, is alongside my bed.
It is hard to explain all that happened. When the French fell back on 
my left it uncovered my flank for 5000 yards, and with a front of 2300 
yards, made my Bde responsible for 7300 yard frontage.
At 6:30pm on the 22nd, I really though all was lost; the enemy came 
sweeping down round our rear, and all that I had left were our servants, 
the Engineer Company, and about 50 of my grenade Co. All the rest 
had been sent forward to fill the gap.
The engagement was mine until the 26th morning, when General Hull 
relieved me with his brigade.
During my four days, at different days, I had in addition to my brigade 
the following under my command the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 10th Canadians 
9th Royal Scots, 4th KO R, Buffs, East Yorks, Durham, Queen Victorias, 
Cornwall L.I., Northumberland, Batteries R F.A.
Letter 8 May 1915, Written on Plain Paper
My Darling Hetty,
Eerie wrote asking me to be godfather to her baby, and I have answered 
at once, how pleased I could be. Please buy the best you can get “silver 
mug” and anything else you think of.
Please thank the Mater and Pater for letters, also Effie. Effie has just 
sent me some more khaki handkerchiefs. Please write her and say how 
pleased I was to get them. It just happened that I was almost out, as a 
lot of our stuff was lost.
When our Headquarters at Ypres was bombarded, the place took fire, 
so a lot of our Officers kits were burnt. We had made our H.Q. also a 
dressing station, but fortunately I think most of the wounded were got 
out in time.
12
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We have had a heavy toll to pay, but I think Canada during those days 
absolutely saved the situation. Things happened to make matters worse, 
that I dare not write about.
Please tell Eerie that I saw Jimmy Mills yesterday looking fit and well, 
also Canon Scott. Canon Scott has been invaluable, his pluck and good 
spirits have been of great help to everyone.
I hope we will have a few days rest here, as my head still feels as if it 
had been pounded. Am well otherwise.
Kendall is still with me and well, please try and see his wife, as I fear 
she is sick.
Yesterday I received your letters of the 11th and 21st April.
Please tell Pater my brigade is 3rd Bde, and it consists of 
the 13th “Royal Highlanders of Canada”
14th “Royal Montreal Regt”
15th (48 th Highlanders)
16th Canadian Scottish
Letter 9 May 1915, Written on Plain Paper
My Darling Hetty,
I do not remember when I wrote you last, so thought as this was Sunday, 
and a half hour to spare that the time was opportune. I don’t know if I 
told you about the hot time we had at Ypres.
On the 22nd April the Germans came sweeping down on our left flank, 
in the big gap left by the French. For a time I thought it was all up; 
the enemy had got well down in rear of my Head Quarters, and with all 
my troops up forward, I only had with me our servants, the 1 Company 
Engineers and about 30 men from our Grenade Co: for about an hour 
this small force stayed them off, then we were re-inforced by the Royal 
Montreal Regt.
13
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The fighting continued 23.24.25th: from the 20th April to 4 May, I 
never undressed, and only had my boots of [sic] twice. On the 25th, 
as our house had become dangerous, we moved into a corner of a cow 
stable early in the morning; the enemy found out where we were and 
about 4pm they dropped 70 high explosive shells about, and on our, 
buildings within a radius of 30 yards. It was most nerve racking, and it 
drove 4 of the officers with us silly; in the end when we had to get out, 
we had to swim across the moat which was full of dirty water.
I hugged the bank for some time, before I could make up my mind to 
a wetting, but did it in the end. The two following nights, I spent with 
Hughes and Cameron, in a small dug out; not large enough for us to sit 
up in, just room to crawl in. Then 3 more nights in a large dug out, all 
this time the shell fire was something to remember. It certainly has been 
an experience, costly but honourable in every sense to Canada.
We are having a few days respite to re-organize.
I am well, and trying to make up the sleep that is coming to me.
I love your dear letters, and the brave spirit that keeps you up.
I say a prayer for you every night and my bairns, and hope I will not be 
very long before I am home with all I hold dear.
Good night sweetheart mine, dearest love from your Old Man,
Ernest
Document Two: R.E.W. Turner Narrative
On the 22-4-15 the 1st Canadian Div. was holding a Front Line of 
roughly 5500 yards between the Ypres-Poelcapelle roads, and the 
Ypres-Paschendal [sic] roads with 2 Brigades in Line.
The 3rd Brigade on the left joined up with the French Moroccan Div.
The 13th and 15th Battalions were in with a frontage between 3/3500 
yards.
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The 2nd Brigade with the 8th and 5th Battalions in line on a frontage 
between 2/2500 yards.
The Officer Com.dg the left-sector had his H.Q. in St. Julien with a 
small local reserve.
The 14th Battalion (less 1 Company) formed the Brigade Reserve in 
billet near St. Jean.
The 16th Battalion formed part of the Divisional reserve in billets in 
Ypres, across the Canal.
The 1st Brigade and 10th Battalions were also in the Divisional Reserve.
On the 22nd April at 5.30 pm a report was received by 3rd Bde H.Q. 
that the French on our left sub section were being subjected to a heavy 
artillery bombardment accompanied by the projection of green cloud 
of gas of a pungent odour. The Turcos completely broke-chiefly by the 
gas-but partly by superstition, and streamed in panic to the rear. The 
Germans poured through the gap which left the front open from the 
left of the 13th Battalion to the Yser Canal. Major Ruppert McCraig 
Commanding left Co of the 13th Battalion extended his line for about 
150 yards in the French evacuated area. Our men were not definitely 
attacked at this time-and although affected by the drifting gas, and 
brought a heavy rifle fire to bear on the portions of the German attack 
within range.
The 3rd Artillery Brigade also co-operated.
That evening between 6-7 pm the company of the 14th Bn. in local 
reserve was moved to the left, and dug in along the Poelcapelle [sic] road.
Major W.B. King’s battery continued in action - “our artillery formations 
were behind the French line” - in actions-although the Germans were 
within 200 yards guns over open sights-and ammunition had to be 
brought up by hand.
The 14th Bn (less 1 Co) was ordered up to Brigade H.Q., and posted in 
the G.H.Q. 2nd Line.
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We also extended, and the 3rd Field Co Canadian Engineers dug a 
trench along a ditch extending east from our H.Q.
Also placed in the line the Brigade Grenade Co-Batmen and grooms.
About 8pm we were advised the 16th Bn and 10th Bn were being sent 
by Division to come under 3rd Brigade.
A counterattack with these 2 Bns was planned, and at 11.50pm 
the German positions in the wood called by the French “Bois des 
Cuisinieres” because they had their cooking done there-was attacked.
As the 10th was the first Bn it was given place, and when the 16th BN 
arrived it formed up in rear of the 10th Bn.
The 2 Bns attacked on a frontage of 2 companies-with distances of 30 
yards between lines
10th Bn Lieut Col. Boyle Commanding 
16th Bn Lieut Col. Leckie R.G.
Bombers of the 2nd and 3rd Brigade also formed with this attack. 
Bayonets were fixed-as it was to be taken by cold steel.
The German in the short time had already dug a shallow trench- 
strengthened by sand bags and 3 rows of wire.
The night was bright, and the enemy spotted the attack when about 500 
yards away and poured in a terrific rifle fire.
Unfortunately Col. Boyle of the 10th Battalion was mortally wounded- 
so the complete defensive organization fell on Col. R.G.E. Leckie 
Commanding officer 16th Battalion.
It was in this wood the 4.7 guns were captured; erroneously stated to 
be Canadian.
While this attack was in progress the 2nd and 3rd Battalions under 
Cols. Watson and Remmie reported at 3rd Brigade Headquarters.
The 2nd Bn was sent to fill the gap from the troops immediately north 
of St. Julien towards wood in C I. I. And the 3rd Bn was held in reserve.
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At first the 10th and 16th Bns entrenched north of the captured wood; 
but it was found due to heavy loss of officers and other ranks. The 
position involved such a salient with the increased length of line that 
this could not be consolidated and touch maintained.
The line was therefore withdrawn to the former German trench south 
of the wood before daylight. During the night the 2nd Buffs reported 
to 3rd Bde H.Q. and were ordered forward to support the left flank of 
the 13th Battalion-after they moved off counter orders were received to 
return the Bn to Col Geddess for his defence force. This we did less 1 
Company which had been committed to the line.
The 2nd Brigade on request placed 3 Companies of the 7th Battalion in 
the vicinity of Kerselare.
At 5A.M. 23rd April 2 companies of the 3rd Battalion under Major 
Kirkpatrick were sent to the line south edge of wood to get in touch 
with the 2nd Battalion-2 companies were placed in G.H.Q. 2nd line to 
replace 2 companies of the 14th Bn sent to St. Julien.
During the night 22/23 April our artillery had to be withdrawn from 
their exposed positions (our guns were really in rear of the now open 
French line) for a period that night the only gun under my orders 
belonged to the 75th Battery (British) under Lt. Graham. This gun was 
in the workshops at St Jean-the officer hearing the firing came up to 
see if he could be of any use.
His gun was manhandled up and went in to action between my Brigade 
H.Q. buildings-he had only 60 rounds-as 40 rounds were expended 
during dark, and 20 rounds held for daylight. (This officer was later sent 
to Gallipoli but I succeeded in getting the M.C. for him)
Minor attacks occurred during the night 22/23 April along the 
Poelcapelle road but did not seriously affect the situation; although the 
Germans had actually reached the outskirts of St. Jean to our rear, and 
burnt the 3rd Co Field Engineers billets.
On the A.M. 23rd the original line of French from Poelcapelle Road 
to Kerselare was held passing south of wood, and in contact with Col. 
Geddes Force on our west flank.
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At 9.15 AM. an attack was ordered; but was not made (under orders of 
G.O.C. 1st Can Div) until 3.45pm.
It was to have been made by 2 Bns from Col. Geddes force 
2 “ [blank]” 27 th Division 
Bns of the 13th Brigade 
1st and 4th Bns Canadians 
3rd Bde to assist as much as possible
I said we would assist if the attack reached Pilkem-but it failed to reach 
there-sustained very heavy losses-and dug in a long way short of the 
objective-the old front-line. The G.O.C. 1st Can. Div. in their official 
diary claims to have advised throwing back our left flank to reduce the 
salient. Actually the order was due to the O/C 13th Bn and I confirmed 
his suggestion.
After Geddes Force dug in between the Yser Canal, we extended our 
left with part of the 14th Bn to connect up.
On the A.M. orders were given the O/C St. Julien to form a left 
defensive flank to Kerselare; the 3 Companies 7th Bn, and 1 Co 5th Bn 
to conform.
This change was carried out night 23/24th without casualties by the 
13th Bn, part of 7th Bn, and 1 Co Buffs. It was realized the retirement 
and change of position would place the new trenches on the forward 
slope in a position exposed to a direct artillery fire.
23rd April. On this date the D.C.L.I. and 9th Royal Scots also 4th Bn 
Rifle Brigade were ordered report to me-but before arriving-they were 
diverted by other orders to fill the gap on my left towards the canal.
I had intended using these troops for another “counter attack”
French report “enemy running short of ammunition
18
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24th at 5.30 AM the enemy opened a heavy artillery fire on the whole 
of our original front line trenches, also over a short stretch of the front 
of the 2nd Brigade.
The shelling was followed, by a discharge of noxious gas.
23 April 1915 Ypres
If we live for a couple of days longer our Canadian Troops will have 
added a spended [sic] page to history. Our casualties have been very 
heavy-but the Canadians positively saved the day. The 10th and 
16th Battalions made a counter attack at mid night on the “Bois des 
Cuisinieres” - under a hail of bullets-and drove the Germans clear 
through the wood.
We had to leave our wounded on the ground for 24 hours as it was 
impossible to remove them. The first was so intense.
Have had congratulatory messages from the Army and Corps.
The fight is still on-it is hardly safe to step outside the door-we have 
knocked a hole in the wall of the house so as to get to the signal and 
telephone dugout.
Every room here is filled with wounded men, and the windows are all 
sand bagged-Our house was hit for the first time by three shells. I have 
been up now for 40 hours without sleep, and will be up tonight also.
One man just killed outside the front door-although the North side is 
where the attack is coming from.
23 April
We turned all our horses except one, loose with the hope they would get 
away-but they stopped to graze and were killed in the fields.
When the Germans broke through the French Line “Turcos” - The 3rd 
Can Artillery Brigade co-operated with the 13th Battalion in the flank 
fire.
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2 Companies of the 3rd Battalion were sent to edge of wood to connect 
with the 2nd Battalion.
At 9pm 23rd 2 Companies 14th Bn under Col Burland were sent to re­
enforce 16th Battalion near edge of wood. These companies took with 
them attached 3 M.G.’s with crews from the 3rd Bn. When the 16th Bn 
position was consolidated these 2 companies under Col. Burland were 
ordered at dusk 24rd up to St. Julien where they joined up with No. 2 
Co also of the 14th Bn-all under orders of Col. Loomis who was actg. 
Comd. of St. Julien Defences.
Col. F.S. Meighen was in Command of all troops in G.H.Q. 2nd line-This 
line was strengthened and improved towards the north-No traverses.
After a stern resistance the fumes and shells compelled our troops to 
retire, including 7th Bn.
As a gap was created between the 2nd and 3rd Brigade-two Bns were 
sent from the 28 Division, and partly filled the gap.
During the day was informed two Bns of the York and Durham Bde 
would report north of Wieltje-but also not to use them if possible; as 
they were to be used to relieve the 3rd Bde that night-this had become 
necessary as it had been impossible to get up food and water for 2 days- 
casualties very heavy combined with lack of sleep and strain.
On the A.M. of the 24th the 8th Bn was faced with a situation somewhat 
similar to ours on the 22nd-as our front had been driven in-and left 
theirs in the air-they repulsed the German attack made with gas, but 
in the end had also to throw back their left flank.
During the day Col. Kemmis-Betty BM 2nd Bde called on me for some 
battalions but I had only one Co. in reserve.
About 1pm 24th after discussion with the GSO 1st Div. it was ordered 
that troops should fall back to G.H.Q. 2nd line-but that garrison in St. 
Julien was to hold out as long as possible-it was this gallant detachment 
that was told to hold until the last.
Following message received from the 5th Corps:
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“Army commander desires me to express to the Canadians his 
appreciation of all they have done.”
Message to 15th Bn (48th Highlanders) Reported impression exists 
in your right that they are to retire on G.H.Q. line stop. This must 
be corrected at once. You are to hold your front line. If driven out- 
collection your men and organize counter attack, and regain it. You are 
on NO account to return to G.H.Q. line sent at 7.15AM. 24-4-15
24-4-15: Message from O/C 13th Bn. All men available now in firing line 
holding with difficult around St. Julien. Col. Burland is in Com.dg of 
left sub sector. Reported they have returned in bad shape. Everything 
possible being done to hold St. Julien.
24-4-15 (11.20pm) To 1st Division:
My Battalions held position after position today in falling back under 
shell fire-until now it appears the 15th Bn is practically gone - 13th Bn 
about 100. 14th Bn about 400. 16th Bn about 250. Total strength about 
750 plus stragglers.
We have had an awful day but are still holding the enemy down-Good 
bye my darling for Today-love to the bairns.
Pope has just done a gallant thing he has gone forward to St. Julien to 
guide two gun limbers loaded with S.A. Ammunition.
26/27-4-15-Arrived about 3.30 AM in a field near Brielen-immediately 
went round the remnants of my battalion-now only a handful-all that 
remained of my gallant Brigade-they had not had time yet to lie down-
27th April - 14th Battalion was only withdrawn from the trenches night 
of the 27th, and marched to the transport lines.
In the midst of all our fighting I received an enquiry from Divisional 
H.Q. asking how many Jews’ harps were wanted for the brigade-entire 
absence of humour on some people.
We did not receive any advice from any source that gas was to be used.
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25th-Lt. Col Vandeleur came in to our pigsty wounded AM sent him 
with Billy Pope to my room in the house-just as they arrived there-a 
shell came through the roof-fortunately it was a dud-but they got out 
in a hurry, and we did not see them again.
25th April 5.30AM A strong counter attack was carried out by Br.Gen. 
Hull with his brigade, and other Bns. His attack covering about 3 days 
used up 15 Battalions.
No enemy attacks during the day, but the trenches were subjected to 
heavy shelling, and my Bde H.Q. destroyed by shell fire-when we moved 
Bde H.Q. to 16th BnH.Q. Near the G.H.Q. line-The enemy poured 70 
5.9 shells into my Bde H. in 50/60 minutes-set all on fire!
The 3rd Brigade was relieved night of 25/26A and marched across the 
canal to Brielen, but the operations were continued on the new line. Up 
to 6/7 May-On the 8th May the storm burst-on the P.P.C.L.I., north of 
Bellewaerde Lake-they held on all day, but at night what was left had 
to be withdrawn as the 28th Div had failed to regain their former line 
due to the gas and artillery fire-but the German infantry attack failed 
under the stout resistance they encountered.
If it is not invidious I would like to pay credit for the Canadian success 
22/25th to the “counter attack” and to the skilful [sic] manner in which 
Col. Loomis of the 13th BN handled the St. Julien mixed force.
My Bde H.Q. was turned in to an Advanced Dressing station and each 
A.M. when floors were flushed-walls ran out as a red stream.
Field Message
26-4-15 - 3rd Can. Brigade following message received from General 
Plumer begins “Will you please express to Br. Com.dg officers and all 
ranks my appreciation of the splendid service they have rendered from 
Canadian Division.”
Actual present conditions and what we have undergone during the 
last 10 days prevent me from writing you at length. Under a merciful 
providence am still alive and in the game, and well-Love to you dear, 
and the bairns.
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Men in the trenches for days almost without food and water-blown up- 
buried by shell fire-but fighting-fighting always-hemmed in by enemies 
on all sides-with German air in control.
At our H.Q. we had men wounded actually in the house-bullets going 
through the door-or through the sand bags with which the windows 
were protected.
A big shell 5.9 went through the end of our signal dug out but fortunately 
it did not explode-but it made the dug out rock like a boat.
The wounded as collected by night only were brought to my H.Q. which 
was turned in to an Advanced Dressing Station, then carried outside, 
and laid in rows close up to the side of the house. No ambulance could 
clear after day. Walking cases were started across the fields to Wieltje 
and St. Jean but many never reached there.
3 May 1915-Near Vlamertigne
I fear some of your letter may have been lost; as part of our mail in 
Ypres was blown up. The troops have had a heavy strain put upon 
them, and our loses have been very heavy.
It will be a long time before the re-constituted brigade can equal our 
originals.
My highlanders died at their posts; I knew before the end came that 
they could not withdraw, as it was absolutely necessary to delay the 
enemy as long as possible. A rest is essential, as the Bns have to be 
completely re-organized again-we are to be withdrawn at 2.15A.M. 
tomorrow.
I have not been able to get my head clear since a week-At the present 
time we are living in a dug out which is large enough for four of us lying 
down; the telephone that connects my Bns nearly a mile away is at my 
head. It is hard to explain all that happened when the trench fell back 
it uncovered my left flank for 5000 yards as far as the Yser Canal. My 
frontage was 2300 yards.
23
and : Sir Richard Turner and the Second Battle of Ypres, April and May 1915
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
4 1 6  : F r o m  th e  C W M  A r c h iv e s
At 6.30pm on the 22nd April I really thought all was lost, as the 
enemy came sweeping down round our rear-all that I had in hand at 
my Brigade H.Q. were our servants-the 3rd Engineer Co-which was 
holding an extension from the H.Q. - and about 50 of the 3rd Brigade 
grenade company-all the rest had been sent forward to fill the gap.
It was my responsibility until 25th/26th when Br.Genl Hull relieved me 
with his Brigade. In addition to my Brigade I had the 2nd,3rd,7th,ioth 
Canadian battalions-one Co. of 1st Buffs-R.F.A. - etc.
We are all very tired from days and nights of endless strain-with no 
sleep. I had men killed by enemy fire actually at the door of the house 
where my H.Q.’s was-to get to the Signal Dug Out-we knocked a hole 
in one side of the house, as it was too dangerous to pass outside.
A 5.9’’ German shell came in to the dug out signals-but fortunately it 
did not explode and is under our feet now when telephoning.
The Brigade was relieved night of the 3/4 May, and moved to West side 
of Yser Canal to bivouac near Brielen.
8 th May 1915 Steenwerck
Welcome letters received from the Pater-Mater Effie and Eerie. When 
our H.Q. at Ypres was bombarded-the place took fire and a lot of our 
officers kits were burnt.
We had made the H.Q. also an advanced dressing station, but I think 
fortunately most of the wounded were got out.
My head still feels as if it had been pounded.
Just received your letter of the 21st April.
At present we are in the 3rd Army Corps - 2nd Army under General 
Sir H.L. Smith-Dorrien.
General S-D called on me yesterday he said “I thank you for what you 
and your gallant men have done-you saved Ypres, and all our Army 
from a terrible disaster.”
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At one time I had to give the order “that there was no falling back”
The guns in the wood of which you you hear so much; when found by 
our Battalions in the mid-night counter attack-are a side issue.
They had been abandoned by the Britishh-Canon Scott’s pluck and 
good spirits have been invaluable to everyone.
Head Quarters 2nd Army, 6-5-15
Letter from Gen. H.L. Smith-Dorrien to Major General Alderson,
Congratulating Canadians on the gallant deeds on the night of the 22nd 
of April 1915 and following days. The more details I learn the greater to 
me does their resourcefulness and bravery appear.
I would like you to communicate to the whole Division my thanks 
and admiration as Army Commander for the services rendered to the 
2nd Army during the critical period following the German’s successful 
attack on our Allies on the night of the 22nd April
Sgd. H.L. Smith-Dorrien
9th May 1915. Sunday Steenwerck
I don’t know if I told you about the hot time we had at Ypres-when 
the Germans came sweeping round our left-flank after the French rout.
On the 25th April our house had become too dangerous, and we moved 
in to a pig pen at the end of the stable-the enemy found out where we 
were, and dropped 70 high explosive shells about and on our buildings 
within a radius of 30 yards-It was most nerve racking, and broke 
Pope-Cameron and Lyne-Evans. In the end we had to go through the 
moat with filthy water up to our necks. The next two nights I spent 
with Gamel-Hughes and Cameron in a small dug-out only covered with 
boards and earth-just room to crawl in and lie down-the following 3 
nights in a larger dug-out-but all the time the shell fire was some thing 
to remember.
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From the 20th April to 4 May, I never undressed, and only had my 
boots off twice.
12 May 1915-Steenwerck
Your welcome letters of the 26 and 28th April have just arrived. I fear 
some of your letters have done down with the “Lusitania.” Thank little 
Evie for thinking and praying for her “Daddy” - There certainly has 
been a merciful providence watching over me. We have had six days 
welcome rest here. The brigade is billeted in farms and having a good 
rest.
Process of re-organizing is a lengthy job-Pope is down with nerves and 
McDonald was wounded.
Capt. T.S. Morrissey from the 13th Bn and Capt. Chas. Porteous from 
the 14th Bn have been appointed to the Brigade Staff.
Kilty was wounded at Ypres on the flank by shrapnel, and was laid up 
for nearly two weeks-I rode her again yesterday for the first time to see 
the Officers of the R.C.D.
They have come over temporarily as Infantry, from England with the 
Strathconas & King Edward Horse. I am sending you a copy of our 
Official Report on the Ypres fighting-but Not for the newspapers.
Pleased to hear you are President of the Ladies Rifle Club.
A long list of Officers and men have been recommended for honours, 
etc-some will be left out-c ’est la fortune de la guerre.
Take good care of yourself; you are always in my thoughts dear.
DOCUMENT THREE: R.E.W. DIARY OF OPERATIONS, 3RD 
CANADIAN In f a n t r y  Br i g a d e , 22 A p RIL t o  5 Ma y  1915
Reference sheets 20 and 28.
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The trench position of the 3rd Canadian Inf. Bde. North of St. Julien on 
the Ypres salient was taken over from French troops of the 11th Division 
on the night of the 16th/17th April. The left of the position rested on 
the Polcappelle— St. Julien Road in V25.a.05 and extended through 
V25.e, V25.d. and D1.b. to road in D2.b. The 2nd Canadian Inf. Bde. 
held the trench line to the right and French troops to the left. A Zouave 
Regt. was in immediate touch on the left. On the 22nd April, the 15th 
Canadian Bn, 48th Highlanders, Lt-Col Currie, were occupying the 
right sub-section having taken it over on the night of 20th/21st and the 
13th Canadian Bn, the Royal Highlanders. Lt-Col Loomis were in the 
left sub-section having relieved on the night of the 21st/22nd. At St. 
Julian under command of O.C. left sub-section were three platoons from 
each of the trench battalions and a company of the 14th Canadian Bn, 
Royal Montreal Regiment, forming a local reserve. Three companies of 
the R.M.R. under Lt- Col Meighen were in Brigade reserve billets in the 
vicinity of St. Jean, and the 16th Canadian Battalion. The Canadian 
Scottish Lt-Col Leckie, formed part of the Divisional reserve billeted in 
the northern part of Ypres.
On the 22nd at 5.30 p.m. a report was received from the left sub-section 
that the French on our left were being subjected to a Heavy artillery 
bombardment, accompanied by the projection of a pale green cloud of 
gas of a peculiarly pungent odour. There was at the time some doubt 
as to whether the gas emanated from the Germans or from the French 
trenches, but it was shortly determined that it was being used by the 
enemy to overcome resistance. Our troops were not attacked definitely 
at this time and although to some extent affected by the gas, they 
brought a heavy fire to bear on the portion of the enemy’s attack within 
their reach. The Third Artillery Bde. also co-operated.
The 14th and 16th Bns, in reserve were ordered to stand to arms and 
the three companies of the 14th were at once ordered to move to Brigade 
Headquarters in C22.b for orders. The 16th Bn. Being in Divisional 
reserve was not available.
By 6.30 p.m. great numbers of French were retiring toward Ypres 
passing in disorganized bodies through St. Julien and the country 
westward. Bodies of the enemy were following in close pursuit. Three 
companies of the 14th Bn. No 3 Field Co, C.E. and Brigade Grenade 
Coy. which were by this time available, were placed in the G.H.Q second
27
and : Sir Richard Turner and the Second Battle of Ypres, April and May 1915
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
420 : F r o m  th e  C W M  A r c h iv e s
line Ci6.a to North C22.b to stay the enemy’s pursuit and attempt to 
rally the retiring French. Some 500 of these stopped in the G.H.Q. line, 
prolonging our line to the N.E. and their conduct was most gallant. 
The German attack in C16, C17 reached within 300 yards of our line 
and as darkness approached they entrenched on a line C10.a south of 
Wood C5.c.
At about 8 p.m. advice was received that the 16th Bn, which had been 
in Divisional reserve as well as the 10th Bn of the 2nd Canadian Bde, 
were placed under orders of the 3rd Canadian Bde. A counter attack 
with this force was planned and at 11.50 p.m. the German position 
in the Wood in C10, C11 was attacked. The Battalions were formed 
on a front of two companies and with distances of 30 yards between 
lines. The 10th Bn. Lt-Col Boyle, led this attack. Thirty bombers of 
the 2nd Bde and 70 of the 3rd Bde companies worked in this attack 
and did very commendable service. The German trenches had been 
strengthened by three tiers of sand bags as well as wire. The night 
was bright and the attack became known to the enemy when our 
troops were 500 yards away so that the advance was carried out under 
terrific rifle and machine gun fire from that distance, but the greatest 
steadiness prevailed. The trenches were carried with the bayonet and 
the wood cleared except for a small redoubt with machine guns at the 
S.W. corner. Lt-Col Boyle was seriously wounded during the attack 
and reorganization fell entirely upon Lt-Col Leckie. In reporting the 
driving out of the enemy this officer stated that he had encountered 
4 guns which he believed to be English 4.7’s in the wood. A message 
was sent to the Third C.F.A. Bde to send horses to remove these but 
unfortunately the motor cyclist was unable to locate his H.Q and the 
message came back the following day undelivered.
While this counter attack was in progress the 2nd and 3rd Bns of the 
1st Canadian Bde under Lt-Col Watson and Lt-Col Rennie respectively, 
reported to assist. The 2nd Canadian Battalion was ordered to fill the 
gap from the troops immediately north of St. Julien towards Wood in 
C11 and the 3rd Canadian Bn. was placed in reserve in C22.c. The 
10th and 16th Bns took up a position some distance north of the wood 
C10, C11, and entrenched, but it was found that owing to the darkness 
which had fallen, and the great loss of officers and N.C.O.’s as well as 
the increased length of line involved in such a salient the position could 
not be consolidated and touch maintained. The line was withdrawn to
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the former German trench line south of the wood, and established there 
before daylight.
During the night 22nd/23rd one company of the 2nd Buffs was detached 
by Col Geddes from his command, and was sent forward to support the 
left flank of the Royal Highlanders about V25. The 2nd Canadian Bde, 
in response to a request for assistance placed three companies of the 
7th British Columbia regiment in the vicinity of Keerselare. At 5 a.m. 
two companies of the 3rd Bn, were sent to the line south edge of wood 
to get in touch with the 2nd Bn, and two companies to occupy G.H.Q. 
second line in C16.a which was vacated by two companies 14th Bn, sent 
forward to St. Julien.
Minor attacks had occurred during the night on the line along Polcappelle 
road but these did not seriously affect the situation.
On the morning of the 23rd the position held was: original French 
line— line of Polcappelle road to Keerselaere— passing south edge of 
wood in C10 to contact with Col Geddes’ command C10.n.
On our front the enemy was not aggressive during the morning of the 
23rd. A counter attack by troops on our left apparently diverted his 
action until late in the afternoon, when two assaults with gas and 
artillery were made on the right of our position. These attacks were 
both repulsed by the 48th Highlanders with great lose to the enemy 
from rifle fire. About mid-day two battalions of the 27th Division 
reported, and two companies of one [sic] the 4th Rifle Bde, were sent 
to St. Julien, but before their arrival there instructions were received 
to send the battalions back to the canal, and these companies were 
withdrawn at once leaving no troops in reserve.
It was found that the enemy had, during the previous night worked 
eastward of the Polcapelle Road, and established a strong position with 
machine guns about U30.D. This rendered the left flank of the former 
trench line untenable and it was determined to draw it back to the line 
D1.a. Keerselaere. This change of position was carried out by the Royal 
Highlanders, the company of 2nd Buffs and the three companies of the 
7th B.C. Regt, without a casualty during the night 23rd/24th. The 
new position was organized and completely occupied before daylight.
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The new position was necessarily on the forward slope of the western 
extremity of Gravenstafel ridge, and later proved difficult to hold.
At 5.30 a.m. 24th, the enemy opened a heavy artillery fire on the whole 
of our original front line trenches. This fire appeared to cover also a 
short stretch of the parapet of the adjoining troops of the 2nd Canadian 
Brigade. The shelling was followed by an assault with noxious gas, and 
after a stern resistance the fumes and shells compelled our troops to 
retire. A succession of new positions was taken up and each in succession 
was made untenable by the terrific shell fire of the enemy’s artillery. 
The retirement could have been more orderly or harder fought, but the 
enemy was using his field gun fire direct, and the men of the 48th the 
Royal Highlanders, the Buffs and the 7th were literally blown out of 
position after position. The enemy’s rifles and machine guns did little of 
the work, and his infantry advanced after ours had been thrown back. 
As the troops occupying the original front line trenches were gradually 
driven southward by this fire, the enemy’s attack developed also from 
his new positions and N. and E. of St. Julien, and the troops holding 
this line were subjected to a similar fire. The casualties were heavy— it 
was on this morning that virtually all except those in the 10th and 16th 
battalions occurred.
When the need for troops became apparent at about 5 a.m. the 16th 
and 10th Bns were withdrawn from their position south of C10, C11 
and the adjoining battalions were thinned out so as to occupy their 
trenches. This difficult operation was carried out in daylight with very 
few causalities. The 10th Bn, was returned to the 2nd Canadian Brigade 
and the 16th Battalion held in reserve in C23.c. At about 8 a.m. 200 
men of the 16th went forward under Major Leckie to support the troops 
retiring on St. Julien.
Information was received during the morning of the 24th that two 
battalions of the York and Durham Brigade would be available and 
would report north of Wieltje. Instructions were also received that these 
battalions should not be used unless absolutely necessary. Consequently, 
when these battalions, the 5th Durhams and the 4th Yorks reported 
they were ordered to prolong the unoccupied G.H.Q. line east of the St. 
Julien— Ypres Road [sic]. Large bodies (estimated at 2,500) of the enemy 
were seen collecting in the direction of Langemarck and the roads in the
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neighborhood of Polcappelle [sic] were occupied by considerable bodies 
of cavalry. Our artillery was directed on these targets.
After a discussion of the general situation with the G.S.O. 1, 1st 
Canadian division at about 1p.m. 24th, it was ordered that troops 
should fall back on G.H.Q. 2nd line. Later in the day it was found that 
troops in St. Julien had not retired. The village was surrounded by the 
enemy and communication impossible. It is probable that 100 men held 
out in St. Julien.
At 4 p.m. a message was received from the O.C. 27th division stating 
that two battalions under O.C. Suffolks and one battalion Royal Irish 
Fusiliers had been directed, the former against Fortuin, and the later 
to Cross Roads C23X. and instructing G.O.C. 3rd Canadian Brigade 
to take command in that part of the field. No previous information of 
these troops had been received but shortly after receipt of this message 
the Royal Irish Fusiliers reported himself [sic] between St. Julien and 
Fortuin. Personal Communication was at once established with him, 
but he was not in touch with the Suffolk command.
Late in the afternoon of the 24th the 4th Yorks and one and one half 
companies of the Queen Victoria Rifles reported and were held in 
support behind the line.
The O.C. Royal Irish Fusiliers was instructed that unless he received 
orders before 7 p.m. he should withdraw his battalion as he was 
unsupported.
Under instruction of G.O.C. 27th Division at 3 a.m. 25th, the 4th Yorks 
and 4th Durhams were ordered to move to a position facing north west 
in D8.a. to C18.c.
At 5.30 a.m. on 25th a counter attack under General Hull with five 
battalions was directed against the enemy from wood C10.c. to St. 
Julien. No enemy counter attacks were directed against our position 
during the day, but the trenches were subjected to very heavy shelling 
and the Brigade Headquarters in C22.b. was destroyed by shell fire, and 
was moved to C22.d.
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The 3rd Brigade was relieved by the 10th Brigade, and moved to 
bivouac in H5.c. on the night of 25th/26th.
At 10 a.m. 26th the Brigade was ordered into reserve at La Broque 
behind an attack of French and Indian troops. Shelter trenches were 
dug at La Brique when orders were received to move south of Wieltje. 
Troops were moved at 3 p.m. 26th and dug in between St. Jean and 
Wieltje east of road.
On night of 27th/28th Brigade moved to bivouac in H5.c.
On night 28th/2gth the 14th and 16th battalions occupied trenches 
on west bank of Yser canal for defense of bridges with 13th and 15th 
battalions in reserve in B2g.d.
On night 2gth/30th all battalions moved into reserve trenches in 
C1g.c— C20.d.
On night 3rd/4th May moved to bivouac in B26.
On night of 4th/5th May moved to billeting area south of Bailleul.
Signed. R.E.W. Turner 
Brigadier General
Commanding 3rd Infantry Brigade.
P.F Villiers Capt
a/-Brig Maj. 3 Can. Inf. Bgde
The authors would like to thank Brook Durham and Michael Tepper for 
transcribing Turners reports and letter.
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